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This paper examines whether the negative association between aggregate earnings and returns is 
explained by the monetary policy news in aggregate earnings. Using Federal funds futures data 
to construct a measure of policy news, we find that aggregate earnings convey information about 
the Fed’s policy actions. Additionally, the negative aggregate earnings-returns association is 
muted when we control for policy surprises. This result is more pronounced in periods with 
negative policy surprises, which tend to trigger a more significant market reaction. Taken 
together, these results suggest that aggregate earnings convey policy news and the market reacts 
negatively to policy surprises, which drives the negative aggregate earnings-returns association. 
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It is widely known that the stock market reacts positively to earnings surprises at the firm 
level. Recent research (e.g., Kothari et al., 2006; Cready and Gurun, 2010) documents a negative 
association between stock returns and contemporaneous earnings surprises at the aggregate level, 
suggesting that aggregate earnings convey discount rate news. The exact channel through which 
aggregate earnings convey discount news, however, remains largely a puzzle. In this study, we 
help shed light on this question by examining: (1) whether aggregate earnings contain 
information about monetary policy news as measured by unexpected changes in the Federal 
funds rate; (2) whether the monetary policy news in aggregate earnings can explain the negative 
aggregate earnings-returns association; and (3) whether the market fully anticipates the policy 
news in aggregate earnings. 
The Federal funds rate—the interest rate banks charge each other for overnight loans of 
reserve balances—is the U.S. Federal Reserve’s primary tool for monetary policy. The Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) is responsible for setting the Federal funds target rate 
(hereafter, the target rate). The FOMC adjusts the target rate through open market operations, 
which affect the provision of reserves to depository institutions. At each meeting, the FOMC 
adjusts the target rate in line with economic developments. When economic data are stronger 
(weaker) than expected, the FOMC is likely to increase (decrease) the target rate. A large 
literature finds that the stock market reacts negatively (positively) to unexpected increases 
(decreases) in the target rate (e.g., Jensen et al., 1996; Thorbecke, 1997; Jensen and Mercer, 
2002; Rigobon and Sack, 2004; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). 1  If aggregate earnings are 
positively associated with future GDP growth and inflation (e.g., Konchitchki and Patatoukas,                                                         
1 For instance, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) find that an unexpected rate cut of 25 bps is associated on average with 
a 1% increase in market returns. They also show that the effect on returns can be attributed largely to changes in the 
risk premium. 
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2014a, 2014b; Shivakumar and Urcan, 2014), then positive (negative) aggregate earnings news 
may be predictive of increases (decreases) in the target rate, resulting in a negative (positive) 
market reaction. We therefore predict that the negative aggregate earnings-returns association is 
driven at least in part by the monetary policy news in aggregate earnings. 
To test this prediction, we begin by replicating Kothari et al. (2006). Specifically, we 
perform a quarterly analysis of the association between stock returns and contemporaneous 
earnings surprises. Because we measure monetary policy news using changes in the target rate, 
we end our sample in 2007, the last year the target rate was the main policy instrument used by 
the Fed. Consistent with Kothari et al. (2006), we find a significantly negative aggregate 
earnings-returns association over the 1972-2007 period. When we control for changes in the 
target rate, however, this negative association becomes insignificant. We next conduct vector 
autoregression analysis and find that aggregate earnings are predictive of target rate changes up 
to one quarter ahead, even after controlling for GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment. In 
particular, a one-standard-deviation positive shock to aggregate earnings growth is associated 
with a target rate hike that is 17.5 bps higher one quarter after the shock. This indicates that 
aggregate earnings convey monetary policy news that can contribute to the negative aggregate 
earnings-returns association. 
We next move from the quarterly analysis to conduct two sets of short-window analyses: 
monthly analysis using monthly returns and FOMC announcement analysis using one-day 
FOMC announcement returns. The short-window analyses provide additional insights on the 
monetary policy channel. First, monetary policy decisions are made at least eight times a year. 
As a result, there can be multiple FOMC announcements and target rate changes within a quarter 
(potentially in opposite directions). The frequency of FOMC announcements can thus make it 
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difficult to cleanly isolate the effect of target rate changes on a quarterly basis. Second, the short-
window analyses allow us to employ Federal funds futures to construct a market-based measure 
of policy news that better distinguishes the unexpected component from the expected component 
of target rate changes. This measure is important because unexpected changes in the target rate, 
not expected changes, are what trigger a market reaction. The market-based measure of policy 
news also allows us to examine the extent to which the aggregate earnings-returns association is 
affected by the strength of the market’s reaction to policy news. Third, by utilizing one-day 
policy surprises and one-day announcement returns, we can isolate the rate surprises as well as 
the market’s reaction for each FOMC announcement, providing direct evidence on whether the 
market fully anticipates the policy news in aggregate earnings.  
For the monthly analysis, we construct monthly aggregate earnings changes using the 
earnings announced in the corresponding month. To construct monthly policy surprises, we 
follow Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and use Federal funds futures data. We first examine 
whether aggregate earnings changes convey information about policy news and whether the 
market reacts to policy surprises. We find that aggregate earnings are positively associated with 
both contemporaneous and one-month-ahead policy surprises, suggesting that positive earnings 
news is predictive of positive policy surprises (i.e., larger-than-expected rate hikes or lower-than-
expected rate cuts by the Fed). We also find a significantly negative market reaction to policy 
surprises, with the reaction being stronger for negative policy surprises.  
Turning to the monthly aggregate earnings-returns association, we find that aggregate 
earnings are negatively associated with both contemporaneous and one-month-ahead monthly 
returns. When we examine these associations separately over months with negative and positive 
policy surprises, we find that the negative association is only significant in periods with negative 
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policy surprises. In addition, the negative association is muted when we control for the 
corresponding policy surprises. In contrast, during months with positive policy surprises, the 
aggregate earnings-returns association is negative but insignificant, with the magnitude of the 
association largely unchanged when we control for the corresponding policy surprises. Taken 
together, these findings are consistent with the monetary policy news channel. Aggregate 
earnings convey policy news and the market reacts negatively to policy surprises, which drive 
the negative aggregate earnings-returns association. When policy news does not trigger a 
significant market reaction (e.g., in periods with positive policy surprises), we do not observe a 
significant negative aggregate earnings-returns association. 
The significant negative association between aggregate earnings and one-month-ahead 
returns that becomes insignificant when one-month-ahead policy surprises are included in the 
regression suggests that the market does not fully anticipate the upcoming policy news in 
aggregate earnings. To shed further light on this result, we examine whether the FOMC 
announcement-day returns are also predictable. We find a significant negative association 
between aggregate earnings and one-month-ahead FOMC announcement-day returns when 
policy surprise is negative. This association is muted when we control for the one-day policy 
surprises. This finding confirms that the market does not fully anticipate the policy news in 
aggregate earnings prior to an FOMC announcement. More importantly, it provides direct 
evidence that the negative aggregate earnings-returns association is driven at least in part by the 
market’s reaction to the upcoming policy news. 
Our study contributes to several literatures. First, recent research documents a negative 
aggregate earnings-returns association. Our results extend this work by showing that aggregate 
earnings contain monetary policy news, a channel through which aggregate earnings convey 
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discount rate news that can help explain the negative association. Second, while a large literature 
in accounting examines the information content of firm-specific accounting information and its 
usefulness for different economic decisions, few studies examine its aggregate counterpart. Our 
study adds to the growing research on the information content of aggregate earnings. We show 
that aggregate accounting news contains information about the Fed’s monetary policy stance, 
which has practical implications for investors and analysts interested in predicting the Fed’s next 
move. Finally, a large literature in macroeconomics and monetary economics attempts to 
understand the determinants of and responses to monetary policy. Our study complements this 
research by providing evidence on the information role of aggregate earnings.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on the 
Fed’s monetary policy. Section 3 reviews the related literature and presents our main empirical 
prediction. Section 4 outlines the data and sample selection. Section 5 presents our empirical 
research design and results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background: The Fed’s Monetary Policy 
The U.S. Federal Reserve System defines monetary policy as “the actions undertaken by 
a central bank, such as the Federal Reserve, to influence the availability and cost of money and 
credit to help promote national economic goals.”2 The Fed’s explicit monetary policy goals are 
to promote maximum sustainable output and employment and to promote stable prices. These 
goals are prescribed in a 1977 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act.3 The Fed implements its 
policy objectives through three tools: open market operations, discount loans, and reserve 
requirements. The most commonly used policy tool, however, is open market operations, which                                                         
2 See https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm. 
3 See http://www.frbsf.org/publications/federalreserve/monetary/goals.html. 
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traditionally consist of buying or selling U.S. government securities (primarily Treasury bills) to 
target a specified Federal funds rate.  
Decisions about the target Federal funds rate are made by the FOMC, which holds eight 
regularly scheduled meetings per year and additional meetings and/or conference calls as needed. 
Prior to each meeting, the FOMC is provided with the Fed’s Greenbook, which contains their 
economic projections and outlook discussions, and the Beige Book, which provides anecdotal 
information on current economic conditions in each of the 12 Federal Reserve districts as well as 
by sector. Although the FOMC determines the target rate, actual open market operations (the 
buying and selling of government securities) are conducted by the trading desk of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York. 
If the FOMC decides to loosen monetary policy, it will lower the target rate, in which 
case the trading desk will buy government securities from U.S. banks. As a result, banks will 
have more cash reserves. To the extent that banks can make these additional reserves available 
for overnight lending to other banks, the effective Federal funds rate declines. Monetary policy 
tightening, in contrast, involves selling government securities to banks, thereby reducing reserves 
and increasing the effective Federal funds rate.4  
 
3. Related Literature and Predictions 
Kothari et al. (2006) document a negative association between stock returns and 
contemporaneous earnings surprises at the aggregate level. The intuition for the negative 
aggregate earnings-returns association is often illustrated using the decomposition framework of 
Campbell (1991). In this framework, returns (R) are decomposed into an expected component                                                         
4 Prior research considers a number of mechanisms through which monetary policy is transmitted to the economy, 
including the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel, asset price effects, and the credit channel. See 
Mishkin (1995) for an overview of these mechanisms. 
 7 
(𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅)) and an unexpected component (UR), with unexpected returns arising from either cash 
flow news (𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) or discount rate news (𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅): 
𝑅𝑅 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅) + 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅) + 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 . 
Based on this framework, the contemporaneous association between returns and aggregate 
earnings changes (𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸), cov(𝑅𝑅,𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸), can be expressed as follows: 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑅𝑅,𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸) = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅),𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸) + 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ,𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸� − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 ,𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸) . 
One can see from above that a negative aggregate earnings-returns association can arise when the 
association between aggregate earnings news and discount rate news (i.e.,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 ,𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸) ) is 
sufficiently positive and  dominates the association between aggregate earnings news and cash 
flow news (i.e., 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ,𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸� ). 5  Put differently, a negative aggregate earnings-returns 
association suggests that aggregate earnings convey discount rate news. Empirical evidence is 
consistent with this conjecture (Cready and Gurun, 2010; Patatoukas, 2014).6 The exact channel 
through which aggregate earnings convey discount rate news, however, remains largely a puzzle. 
In this study, we propose a monetary policy channel. In particular, we posit that aggregate 
earnings contain monetary policy news, which can help explain the negative earnings-returns 
association at the aggregate level.  
3.1 Aggregate Earnings and Monetary Policy News 
As noted in Section 2, the Fed’s monetary policy has two primary objectives: stable 
                                                        
5 Sadka and Sadka (2009) and Choi et al. (2013) propose an alternative explanation. They argue that aggregate 
earnings changes are largely predictable and hence capture expected earnings rather than earnings news. They 
suggest that the negative aggregate earnings-returns association is driven by the negative association between 
expected earnings and expected returns. Evidence from Cready and Gurun (2010) and Patatoukas (2014), however, 
do not support this alternative explanation (Shivakumar, 2010).  
6 In a concurrent study, Zolotoy et al. (2012) examine whether the aggregate earnings-returns association is state-
contingent. Using a Markov-switching regression framework, they find that the association varies across two states. 
Specifically, they find that in one state, aggregate earnings surprises are positively associated with the discount rate 
due to changes in the real rate, while in the other state, aggregate earnings surprises are negatively associated with 
the discount rate due to changes in the risk premium. 
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prices and maximum sustainable employment and output. When economic data come in stronger 
(weaker) than expected, the FOMC is likely to increase (decrease) the target rate. Exactly what 
economic data are used to arrive at a policy decision is less clear, however, due to the 
discretionary nature of monetary policy. However, given the Fed’s stated objectives, inflation, 
unemployment, and real GDP growth are important inputs in this decision. Hence, when inflation, 
employment, and GDP figures are higher than expected, the market, in anticipation of the Fed’s 
reaction, is likely to revise its expectation about the future target rate upward.  
Evidence from recent research suggests that accounting earnings at the aggregate level 
contain macroeconomic information that can be informative about inflation, unemployment, and 
GDP (e.g., Shivakumar, 2007; Konchitchki and Patatoukas, 2014a, 2014b; Shivakumar and 
Urcan, 2014). For example, Shivakumar (2007), in his discussion of Anilowski et al. (2007), 
offers preliminary evidence that aggregate earnings are positively associated with future 
inflation. Shivakumar and Urcan (2014) find that aggregate earnings surprises are predictive of 
Producer Price Index inflation forecast errors. Similarly, Patatoukas (2014) finds a positive 
association between changes in expected inflation and contemporaneous growth in aggregate 
earnings. Konchitchki and Patatoukas (2014a, 2014b) provide evidence consistent with aggregate 
earnings growth being a leading indicator for nominal and real GDP growth. Taken together, 
these studies suggest that aggregate earnings convey information about macroeconomic 
indicators that can be indicative of the Fed’s intention to lower or raise interest rates. 
3.2 The Monetary Policy Channel 
A large literature in finance and monetary economics finds that the market reacts 
negatively (positively) to unexpected increases (decreases) in the Federal funds rate (e.g., Jensen 
et al., 1996; Thorbecke, 1997; Jensen and Mercer, 2002; Rigobon and Sack, 2004; Bernanke and 
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Kuttner, 2005). Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), in particular, find that the effect on returns is due 
in large part to changes in the risk premium, with unexpected increases (decreases) in the target 
rate associated with an increase (decrease) in the risk premium. Thus, if positive (negative) 
earnings growth is predictive of target rate increases (decreases), and monetary tightening 
(easing) is associated with an increase (decrease) in the risk premium and hence lower (higher) 
stock returns, then we should observe a negative aggregate earnings-returns association. We 
therefore predict that the negative (or weak) aggregate earnings-returns association is driven at 
least in part by the monetary policy news in aggregate earnings. Specifically, if aggregate 
earnings contain news about monetary policy, and the market reacts negatively to policy 
surprises, then the negative aggregate earnings-returns association should be muted when we 
control for policy surprises. 
 
4. Sample and Data 
4.1 Sample 
Both our quarterly and monthly samples come from the intersection of the Compustat and 
CRSP databases. We exclude observations with missing earnings, earnings announcement date, 
beginning-of-quarter stock price, or book value, as well as observations for which the stock price 
is below $1. Because we focus on the monetary policy channel and measure policy news using 
the Federal funds target rate, it is important that we employ a sample period over which the 
target rate is the Fed’s primary policy tool. In 2008, the target rate reached 0% and the Fed began 
using large-scale purchases of Treasury and agency securities (i.e., “quantitative easing”) as its 
primary policy tool.7 We therefore end both our quarterly and monthly samples in 2007.  
For the quarterly sample, we follow Kothari et al. (2006) and include only those firms                                                         
7 We perform a robustness test (untabulated) including 2008 in our sample and find qualitatively similar results.  
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with fiscal quarters ending in March, June, September, or December to calculate aggregate 
earnings. Our quarterly sample is from 1972 to 2007. For the monthly sample, we include all 
firms regardless of fiscal year-end (i.e., we include firms with fiscal quarters ending in any 
month) to calculate aggregate earnings. We follow Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and begin the 
sample period in June 1989 due to the availability of Federal funds futures data, which we use to 
measure policy surprises in our monthly analysis. Our final quarterly (monthly) sample contains 
371,571 firm-quarter (279,574 firm-month) observations over the 1972-2007 (1989-2007) period. 
Macroeconomic and monetary policy variables used in our main analyses come from the 
St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED) and the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s 
real-time data set, while quarterly and monthly macroeconomic forecasts come from the 
Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and Money Market 
Services International (MMS), respectively.8 We obtain FOMC meeting dates from the Federal 
Reserve’s website and Federal funds futures data from the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(CBOE). Variable definitions are summarized in Appendix A. 
4.2 Variable Measurement 
4.2.1 Measuring Policy Surprise 
We follow Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) in measuring monthly and announcement-date 
policy surprises. Specifically, we utilize Federal funds futures to determine market expectations 
of rate changes. See Appendix B for details on the construction of these variables. 
4.2.2 Controlling for Macroeconomic News 
In the quarterly analysis, we control for macroeconomic news using revisions in forecasts 
of inflation, unemployment, and real GDP growth. We measure the corresponding forecast                                                         
8 The SPF solicits forecasts once every quarter (generally after the release of the advance GDP number) and the 
forecasts are released to the public on average two weeks later (i.e., around mid-quarter).  
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revision for quarter q as the difference between the median current-quarter forecast made in 
quarter q and the median one-quarter-ahead forecast made in quarter q-1 (Macro FRq where 
Macro = Inflation, Unemp, RGDP).9 The quarterly forecast data come from the SPF and the 
forecasts are released mid-quarter. Macroeconomic forecast errors can also be used to capture 
macroeconomic news. However, because the realized values of macroeconomic indicators are 
released after the end of each quarter, quarterly forecast errors are relatively stale compared to 
quarterly forecast revisions. In particular, forecast errors measured in quarter q provide news 
about the prior quarter whereas forecast revisions measured in quarter q provide news for the 
contemporaneous quarter.10 Therefore, in the quarterly analysis, we use forecast revisions to 
capture macroeconomic news.11 
In the monthly aggregate earnings-returns analysis, we control for macroeconomic news 
using forecast errors instead of forecast revisions due to the lack of availability of one-month-
ahead forecasts. Specifically, we use the median monthly forecasts of inflation, unemployment, 
and industrial production growth from MMS to measure the corresponding forecast error, which 
is the difference between the median forecast and the corresponding realized value for month t-1 
released in month t (Macro FEt where Macro = Inflation, Unemp, IndPro). Notice that in the 
monthly analysis we control for news about industrial production instead of real GDP growth 
because, unlike inflation and unemployment, real GDP is measured quarterly. Also, while the 
MMS forecasts for inflation, unemployment, and industrial production start in 1980, forecasts for                                                         
9 In the quarterly analysis, we use GDP deflator growth to measure inflation rather than the Producer Price Index 
(PPI) or Consumer Price Index (CPI) growth because of data availability. In particular, the SPF does not provide PPI 
inflation forecasts and only provides CPI inflation forecasts starting in 1981. In untabulated robustness tests, we run 
our quarterly analysis using CPI growth instead of GDP deflator growth to proxy for inflation and find qualitatively 
similar results for the shorter time period. 
10 In general, macroeconomic news is released in different forms throughout the quarter. Our goal is to control for 
contemporaneous macroeconomic news that is released. We use macroeconomic revisions of the three major 
indicators to proxy for the overall macroeconomic news for the quarter.  
11 In an untabulated robustness test, we use forecast errors to proxy for macroeconomic news in the quarterly 
aggregate earnings-returns analysis and find qualitatively similar results. 
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real GDP growth start in 1990; thus, using real GDP forecasts would further reduce our time 
series.12 Additionally, we use PPI forecast errors to measure inflation news because Shivakumar 
and Urcan (2014) find that aggregate earnings have predictive ability for future changes in PPI 
rather than CPI. 
 
5. Empirical Research Design and Results 
5.1 Quarterly Analysis 
For the quarterly analysis, we begin with descriptive statistics of quarterly aggregate 
earnings changes, target rate changes, and macroeconomic forecast revisions. Specifically, we 
calculate the average and median values of aggregate earnings growth, the change in the target 
rate, and the three macroeconomic forecast revision variables for three subsample periods: 
“Decrease” (when the target rate decreases), “Increase” (when the target rate increases), and “No 
Change” (when the target rate remains the same). Eq is aggregate earnings for quarter q-1 
announced in quarter q, where earnings is defined as earnings before extraordinary items. 
Aggregate earnings growth, dEq, is seasonally differenced quarterly earnings (i.e., Eq – Eq-4) 
scaled by the aggregate lagged market value of equity. The change in the target rate, ΔTargetq, is 
the difference between Targetq and Targetq-1, the target rate as of the end of quarters q and q-1, 
respectively. Macroeconomic forecast revisions (Macro FRq, where Macro = Inflation, Unemp, 
RGDP) are as defined in Section 4.2.  
The results are reported in Table 1. We find that 31.9% (37.5%) of the sample quarters 
correspond to a decrease (increase) in the Federal funds target rate. Further, as expected, median 
aggregate earnings growth is positive (negative) during periods of increasing (decreasing) rates.                                                         
12 In untabulated robustness tests, we use forecasts of real GDP growth instead of industrial production growth. We 
find qualitatively similar results using the shorter time series. 
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We also find that inflation (unemployment) forecast revisions are negative (positive) during 
periods of decreasing rates and positive (negative) during periods of increasing rates, consistent 
with the Fed’s stated goals of low inflation and unemployment. 
5.1.1 The Aggregate Earnings-Returns Association  
Next, we replicate Kothari et al. (2006) by estimating the contemporaneous aggregate 
earnings-returns relation.13 We do so for both the Kothari et al. (2006) sample period (1972-
2000) and our extended sample period (1972-2007). Specifically, we estimate: 
 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞 = ∝ + 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑞𝑞 + 𝜀𝜀𝑞𝑞 , (1A) 
 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞 = ∝ + 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑞𝑞 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑞𝑞−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑞𝑞 , (1B) 
where Rq is the market return over the three months in quarter q (i.e., the quarter in which 
earnings for quarter q-1 are announced), which is measured using the value-weighted CRSP 
indices, and dEq is as previously defined. In Equation 1B, we add lagged dEq to the specification 
in Equation 1A to better capture aggregate earnings news.14  
The results on the contemporaneous earnings-returns association are reported in Table 
2. 15  Focusing first on Equation 1A, we find that consistent with Kothari et al. (2006), the 
coefficient on dEq is negative and significant at the 5% (10%) level, with a coefficient of -7.58 (-
                                                        
13 Kothari et al. (2006) examine various return windows in their quarterly analysis. The main window that yields a 
significantly negative earnings-returns association is the one that measures returns over the three months in the 
quarter in which earnings are announced (in their context, when k =1), which they refer to as the contemporaneous 
association between aggregate earnings and returns. Accordingly, given the focus of our study, we only replicate the 
contemporaneous association between aggregate earnings and returns in our quarterly analysis. 
14 Our Equation 1 (2) is the same as Kothari et al.’s (2006) k=1 regression in their Table 4 under “Earnings change” 
(“Earnings surprise 1”). Our dE measure corresponds to Kothari et al.’s (2006) dE/P-vw measure, which is defined 
as seasonally differenced quarterly earnings scaled by aggregate lagged market value of equity. In untabulated 
robustness tests, we find qualitatively similar results using Kothari et al.’s (2006) dE/B-agg and dE/P-ew measures, 
which are defined as seasonally differenced quarterly earnings scaled by aggregate lagged book value of equity and 
equal-weighted seasonally differenced earnings scaled by the market value of equity, respectively. 
15 We perform the Durbin-Watson test to evaluate whether there is sufficient autocorrelation to warrant the use of 
Newey-West standard errors. In both the quarterly and monthly analyses, the Durbin-Watson test statistic is greater 
than one, which indicates that autocorrelation is not likely to be a concern. As a result, we do not use Newey-West 
standard errors in our analysis. We find qualitatively similar results, however, using Newey-West standard errors in 
untabulated analysis. 
 14 
5.05) for the 1972-2000 (1972-2007) period. When we add the control for lagged dEq in 
Equation 1B, we continue to find a negative and significant coefficient on dEq, with a coefficient 
of -11.61 (-11.32) for the 1972-2000 (1972-2007) period.  
To examine whether monetary policy news in aggregate earnings drives the negative 
aggregate earnings-returns association, we estimate the following regressions:  
 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞 = 𝛼𝛼+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑞𝑞+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑞𝑞−1 +  𝛽𝛽3∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑞𝑞 +  𝛽𝛽4∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑞𝑞−1 +  𝜀𝜀𝑞𝑞, (1C) 
 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞 =  𝛼𝛼+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑞𝑞+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑞𝑞−1 +  𝛽𝛽3∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑞𝑞 + 𝛽𝛽4∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑞𝑞−1        + 𝛽𝛽5𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞 +  𝛽𝛽7𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞 +  𝜀𝜀𝑞𝑞, (1D) 
where Rq, dEq, and ΔTargetq are as previously defined. We control for the lagged target rate 
change in order to better isolate the surprise component of policy news because the stock market 
reacts negatively (positively) to surprise increases (decreases) in the target Federal funds rate. In 
addition to controlling for lagged values of dEq and ΔTargetq, in Equation 1D we control for 
macroeconomic news using forecast revisions of inflation, unemployment, and real GDP growth 
(Macro FRq, where Macro = Inflation, Unemp, RGDP) for quarter q, as defined in Section 4.2. 
The results on the effect of target rate changes on the earnings-returns association are also 
reported in Table 2. Because the results for the 1972-2000 and 1972-2007 periods are 
qualitatively similar, we focus our discussion on the latter period. We find that the coefficient on 
dEq becomes insignificant after controlling for target rate changes. In particular, while the 
coefficient on dEq is -11.32 and significant at the 1% level in Equation 1B, it is -7.82 and 
insignificant after controlling for contemporaneous and lagged changes in the target rate in 
Equation 1C, while the coefficient on ΔTargetq is -0.90 and significant at the 10% level. 16 
Adding controls for macroeconomic news in Equation 1D reduces the coefficient on dEq to -5.32                                                         
16 The negative coefficient on the lagged change in the target rate is consistent with prior literature showing that the 
change in the Federal funds rate has predictive ability for future returns (i.e., Patelis, 1997). 
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and increases the R2 from 5.5% to 7.1%. This reduction suggests that macroeconomic news has 
some incremental explanatory power for aggregate returns.17 Taken together, these results are 
consistent with the monetary policy news component of aggregate earnings conveying discount 
rate news, which can help explain the previously documented negative aggregate earnings-
returns association. 
5.1.2 Aggregate Earnings and Target Rate Changes: VAR Analysis 
Next we employ vector autoregression (VAR) analysis to examine whether aggregate 
earnings are predictive of changes in the target rate. Monetary policy studies often include a 
large menu of economic variables with multiple time series (e.g., Bernanke, 1986; Blanchard and 
Watson, 1986). A common approach to mitigating the endogeneity inherent in the time series is 
to use VAR analysis (Sims 1980a, 1980b, 1982, 1986; Stock and Watson, 2001), which models 
each variable as a function of its own lags, as well as the lags of each of the other variables in the 
system. This approach allows us to analyze the effects of shocks to one or more of the variables 
in the system. In basic VAR analysis, the equations are solved using ordinary least squares 
(OLS). If the variables are correlated with each other, which is often the case in a 
macroeconomic time series, then the error terms are correlated and the shocks cannot be isolated. 
Structural VARs require identifying assumptions that prescribe specific causal links such that the 
shocks are uncorrelated. Here, we estimate a structural VAR model that includes five stationary 
variables: dEq, Inflationq, Unempq, RGDPq, and ∆Targetq. 18  Specifically, we consider the 
following structural VAR: 
                                                        
17 For brevity, we suppress the coefficients on the macroeconomic news control variables. In Table 2, Model 4, for 
both the 2000 and 2007 sample, coefficients on inflation and unemployment (real GDP) forecast revisions are 
insignificant (positive and significant at the 10% level). The full table including these coefficients is provided in the 
Internet Appendix. 
18 VAR analysis requires stationary inputs. We assess each variable for a unit root using the Dickey-Fuller test. The 
results of this test suggest that we take the first difference of Unempq.  
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AZq = ϕZq-1 + εq, 
where Zq is a vector of the five stationary variables (dEq, Inflationq, Unempq, RGDPq, and 
∆Targetq), A is a 5x5 full-rank matrix, and E[εq, εq’] = I. We focus on the dynamic responses to 
the structural shocks, εq. To do so, we estimate the reduced-form VAR, 
Zq = BZq-1 + C εq, 
where B denotes A-1ϕ and C denotes A-1. Our estimated VAR includes four lags, which is chosen 
to minimize the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). To identify the system, we impose a set of 
restrictions using a Cholesky decomposition of the estimate of the variance-covariance matrix. 
We order aggregate earnings first, followed by the three macroeconomic indicators (real GDP 
growth, inflation, and unemployment) and the target rate change. 19  This order reflects the 
intuition that aggregate earnings contain news about future macroeconomic expectations, and 
both aggregate earnings and macroeconomic indicators contain news about future monetary 
policy.20 
Results from the structural VAR are best presented in the form of impulse response 
functions (IRFs), which describe how a “response” variable reacts to a one-standard-deviation 
positive shock to an “impulse” variable over time. For the IRFs, we compute 90% bootstrapped 
confidence intervals based on 1,000 replications. Table C1 summarizing the IRF output is 
presented in Appendix C. Figure 1 plots the IRF of the target rate changes to a shock in 
aggregate earnings growth. The x-axis represents the number of quarters following the shock. 
We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in aggregate earnings growth results in a 17.5 bps 
increase in the target rate change one quarter after the shock. This result is consistent with 
aggregate earnings conveying information about the Fed’s monetary policy actions. These results,                                                         
19 Sensitivity tests (untabulated) show that changing the order of the variables does not qualitatively affect our 
results.  
20 Granger causality tests (untabulated) show that aggregate earnings Granger-cause changes in the target rate. 
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along with those in Table 2, offer preliminary evidence that aggregate earnings convey monetary 
policy news that can contribute to the negative aggregate earnings-returns association. 
5.2 Short-Window Analysis 
Analyzing the role of monetary policy news at the quarterly frequency presents several 
concerns than can be mitigated by short-window tests. In this section, we discuss our short-
window tests, in which we employ both monthly and FOMC announcement-day measures of 
returns and surprises. 
5.2.1 Monthly Analysis 
We begin with monthly analyses for the 1989-2007 period. Table 3 reports descriptive 
statistics for monthly aggregate earnings changes, the expected and surprise components of 
changes in the target rate, and macroeconomic forecast errors. We again partition our sample into 
periods of “Decrease,” “Increase,” or “No Change.” The monthly descriptive statistics are 
consistent with our quarterly numbers. In particular, we find that the target rate decreases 
(increases) in 18.4% (13.9%) of the sample months and, as expected, average and median 
aggregate earnings growth is positive (negative) during periods of increasing (decreasing) rates. 
Further, the inflation forecast errors are more negative during periods of decreasing rates than 
during periods of increasing rates. 21  Unemployment (industrial production growth) forecast 
errors are positive (negative) when the target rate decreases but negative (positive) when the 
target rate increases.  
Aggregate Earnings and Policy Surprises 
 The monetary policy channel explanation for the negative aggregate earnings-returns 
                                                        
21 The Fed likely responds to a combination of realized and expected indicators. For example, as the minutes to the 
October 2015 meeting show, “the Committee decided to indicate that, in determining whether it would be 
appropriate to raise the target rate at its next meeting, it would assess both realized and expected progress towards its 
objects of maximum employment and 2% inflation.” (Federal Reserve, 2015). 
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association relies on 1) aggregate earnings containing news about the unexpected component of 
target rate changes and 2) the market reacting negatively to unexpected changes in the target rate. 
Thus, before we provide evidence on the monthly aggregate earnings-returns association, we first 
examine whether aggregate earnings are associated with contemporaneous and future policy 
surprises. Specifically, we estimate the following regressions:  
 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−3 +  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘,    (2A) 
 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−3 +  ∑𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘, (2B) 
where k = {0,1}, Surpriset+k is the monthly policy surprise as defined in Appendix B, dEt is the 
sum of all firms’ seasonally differenced quarterly earnings announced in month t scaled by 
aggregate lagged market value of equity, and Macro Controls include the monthly forecast errors 
Inflation FEt, Unemp FEt, and IndPro FEt. We include lagged values of dEt to better capture 
aggregate earnings news. Specifically, we follow Cready and Gurun (2009) and include dEt-3 to 
control for earnings for the previous quarter announced in month t-3.22  
Table 4 presents results for Equations 2A and 2B, with results for contemporaneous 
surprises (Surpriset) in the left panel and results for one-month-ahead surprises (Surpriset+1) in 
the right panel. Although the coefficient on dEt is positive for both contemporaneous and one-
month-ahead policy surprises, the association is only significant for one-month-ahead surprises. 
Specifically, we find that aggregate earnings growth is significantly positively associated with 
the one-month-ahead policy surprises, suggesting that aggregate earnings news is predictive of 
policy surprises. For instance, the coefficient of 0.11 for dE in Equation 2A implies that a one-
standard-deviation increase in aggregate earnings news is associated with a 2.3 bps increase in                                                         
22 In the monthly analysis, controlling for dEt-3 is similar to controlling for dEq-1 in the quarterly analysis (i.e., 
controlling for the previous quarter’s earnings changes). Like Cready and Gurun (2009), we control for dEt-3 instead 
of dEt-1 in the monthly analysis because dEt-1 (i.e., Et-1 - Et-13) and dEt (i.e., Et - Et-12) could capture earnings news for 
the same quarter.  
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next month’s funds rate surprises. When we add the macroeconomic news controls in Equation 
2B, the coefficient on dEt remains positive and significant. Moreover, adding the macroeconomic 
controls only marginally increases the adjusted R2, from 4.5% to 4.7%, suggesting that the 
forecast errors convey relatively little incremental information about policy surprises above and 
beyond aggregate earnings growth.  
Market Reaction to Policy Surprise 
 The results above confirm that aggregate earnings contain news about future Federal 
funds surprises. However, for this news to drive the negative aggregate earnings-returns 
association, the market must react negatively to Federal funds rate surprises. Thus, in our next set 
of tests, we follow Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and examine the association between aggregate 
returns and the contemporaneous surprise and expected components of target rate changes using 
the following equation: 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡,           (3)  
where Rt is the monthly CRSP value-weighted return and Surpriset and Expectedt are monthly 
measures of the surprise and expected components of the Federal funds rate change, as defined in 
Appendix B.  
We present results for the full sample in Table 5. We find that, consistent with Bernanke 
and Kuttner (2005), the market reacts significantly negatively to policy surprises. Specifically, a 
1% surprise increase in the target rate is associated with a market response of -9.54%, which is 
slightly lower than the -11.43% documented by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). The reaction to 
the expected component is insignificant.  
 If the negative aggregate earnings-returns association is driven by the market’s reaction 
to policy news in aggregate earnings, then this association should be most negative when the 
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market reaction is strongest. To investigate this link, we follow prior monetary policy literature 
(e.g., Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2004; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Chulia et al., 2010; Lucca and 
Moench, 2015; Ozdalgli and Weber, 2015), which considers the direction of the Federal funds 
surprise as a potential source of variation in the market’s response to a policy surprise. 
Specifically, we divide our sample into positive (surprise > 0) and negative (surprise ≤ 0) policy 
surprises and re-estimate Equation 3. The results for the subsample analysis are also presented in 
Table 5. We find that the coefficient on Surpriset is -10.01 and significant at the 1% level for 
negative surprises, while for positive surprises, it is 3.67 and insignificant at conventional levels. 
These results suggest that the negative relation between returns and policy surprises for the full 
sample is driven by the negative surprise subsample, i.e., the market reaction to policy news is 
strongest in periods with negative policy surprises. 
The Aggregate Earnings-Returns Association 
 We next examine the aggregate earnings-returns association at the monthly frequency for 
the full sample, as well as the positive and negative surprise subsamples using contemporaneous 
and one-month-ahead returns. Specifically, we estimate the following regressions:  
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−3 +  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘, (4A) 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘  = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘,, (4B) 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 +  𝛽𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘+ ∑𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘, (4C) 
where k = {0,1}, Rt+k is the monthly CRSP value-weighted return, Surpriset+k and Expectedt+k 
are monthly surprise and expected changes in the target rate as defined in Appendix B, and dEt, 
and Macro Controls are as previously defined in Section 4.2.  
Panel A (B) in Table 6 reports results for the contemporaneous (one-month-ahead) 
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monthly returns regression, with the full sample results in the left panel and the negative 
(positive) surprise subsample results in the middle (right) panel. For the full sample, we find that 
the negative association between aggregate earnings and both contemporaneous and one-month-
ahead returns is muted when we control for the corresponding Federal funds rate surprises, 
although the association is significantly negative only for the one-month-ahead returns. This is 
perhaps not surprising given that aggregate earnings are informative about one-month-ahead 
surprises but not contemporaneous surprises (see Table 4). The stronger negative association in 
the one-month-ahead monthly returns regression suggests that at least part of the negative 
association documented in the quarterly analysis arises from aggregate earnings containing one-
month-ahead policy news.  
In particular, in the one-month-ahead returns regression in Panel B, the magnitude of the 
coefficient on dEt decreases from -4.02 (significant at the 5% level) in Equation 4A to -2.65 
(insignificant) after controls for policy news are added in Equation 4B. The negative and 
significant coefficient on Surprise is consistent with Bernanke and Kuttner’s (2005) finding (as 
well as our Table 5 results) that the market reacts negatively to policy surprises. When we add 
the controls for macroeconomic news (i.e., forecast errors of inflation, unemployment, and 
industrial production growth) in Equation 4C, the coefficient on dEt and the adjusted R2 remain 
largely unchanged, which suggests that the forecast errors have little additional explanatory 
value above and beyond aggregate earnings and policy news.23 Interestingly, the coefficient on 
dEt-3 is positive and significant in all specifications. This result is consistent with the findings of 
                                                        
23 For Table 6, Panels A and B, the coefficients on inflation, unemployment and industrial production forecast errors 
are insignificant in all specifications. Full tables, including these coefficients can be found in the Internet Appendix. 
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Cready and Gurun (2009) and suggests that some drift occurs at the aggregate level.24  
Table 6 further shows that for both contemporaneous and one-month-ahead returns, the 
coefficient on dEt in Equation 4A is negative and significant only for the negative surprise 
subsample. Specifically, the coefficient on dEt is -3.11 (-3.98) in Panel A (B). Additionally, the 
coefficient on dEt becomes less negative and insignificant after controlling for policy surprises in 
Equation 4B, with the coefficient on Surpriset (Surpriset+1) in Panel A (B) being significant only 
for the negative surprise subsample. Overall, the significant negative aggregate earnings-returns 
association is most evident in periods with negative policy surprises, which corresponds to when 
we observe a strong market reaction to policy news. When there is little policy news (i.e., when 
target rate surprises do not trigger a significant market reaction as in the case of positive policy 
surprises), we do not observe a significantly negative aggregate earnings-returns association. 
These results are consistent with the policy news in aggregate earnings driving the negative 
aggregate earnings-returns association. 
The significant negative association between aggregate earnings and one-month-ahead 
returns suggests that the market does not fully anticipate the upcoming policy news in aggregate 
earnings. We next examine whether aggregate earnings are predictive of next month’s 
announcement-day policy surprise and announcement-day return. 
5.2.2 FOMC Announcement-Day Analysis 
Aggregate Earnings and Policy Surprises 
We first investigate whether aggregate earnings are predictive of future target rate 
surprises on the announcement day (i.e., a one-day surprise) by examining the association 
between aggregate earnings news and one-month-ahead announcement-day surprises. Unlike the                                                         
24 Specifically, Cready and Gurun (2009) argue that if aggregate earnings contain discount rate news, a discount rate 
shock in period t should be followed by opposite-direction discount rate realizations in the next period, consistent 
with lagged earnings news having a positive coefficient. 
 23 
monthly analysis, we do not examine the relation between aggregate earnings and 
contemporaneous announcement-day policy surprises to ensure that we capture earnings news 
released prior to the FOMC announcement. In particular, dEt measures earnings news announced 
throughout month t; thus, some of this news is released after the FOMC announcement. We 
estimate the following regressions:  
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−3 +  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1 (5A) 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡  + 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−3 + ∑𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 +𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1, (5B) 
where dEt is aggregate earnings news announced in month t, and FOMC Surpriset is the Federal 
funds rate surprise measured on the announcement day (or on the day of Open Market Desk 
implementation in the pre-1994 period) as defined in Appendix B. Macro Controls include the 
monthly forecast errors Inflation FEt, Unemp FEt, and IndPro FEt. 
 Panel A in Table 7 reports the results. We find that aggregate earnings are predictive of 
one-month-ahead announcement-day surprises. The coefficient on dEt is 0.11 and significant at 
the 5% level for one-month-ahead surprises, even after controlling for other macroeconomic 
indicators including inflation, unemployment, and industrial production growth forecast errors. 
These results imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in aggregate earnings is associated 
with a 2.5 bps increase in the one-month-ahead Federal funds rate surprises. 
Market Reaction to Policy Surprise 
We next examine whether the market reacts negatively to Federal funds target rate 
surprises on the announcement day by estimating the following regression: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼+ 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡,   (6) 
where FOMC Rt is the CRSP value-weighted return on the FOMC announcement day (or the day 
of Open Market Desk implementation in the pre-1994 period), and FOMC_Surpriset and 
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FOMC_Expectedt are the surprise and expected components of the Federal funds rate change on 
the announcement date as described in Appendix B.  
Panel B of Table 7 presents the results of an estimation of Equation 6 for both the full 
sample and the positive and negative surprise subsamples. As with our monthly analysis in Table 
5, we find that for the full sample, the coefficient on FOMC_Surpriset is negative and 
significant. A 1% surprise increase in the Federal funds rate results in a -4.98% market response, 
similar to the -4.68% reaction documented by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) in their 1989-2002 
sample. Consistent with Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), we also find a small positive reaction to 
the expected rate change. When we separately consider positive and negative surprises, we find 
that this negative association is driven primarily by the negative surprise subsample. Specifically, 
the coefficient on FOMC_Surpriset in the negative surprise subsample is -4.66 and significant at 
the 1% level while the coefficient in the positive surprise subsample is -2.89 and insignificant. 
For the negative (positive) surprise subsample, the coefficient on FOMC_Expectedt is 
insignificant (positive and significant).25  
The Aggregate Earnings-Returns Association 
To examine whether aggregate earnings are predictive of announcement-day returns, we 
estimate a set of regressions that are similar to Equations 4A-4C, but we replace the one-month-
ahead monthly returns and policy surprises with one-month-ahead FOMC announcement-day 
returns and policy surprises, respectively. Specifically, we estimate the following equations for 
both the full sample and the positive and negative surprise subsamples: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−3 +  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1, (7A)                                                         
25 One potential explanation for the positive coefficient on the expected change in the positive surprise subsample is 
that when releasing a larger-than-expected rate hike, the Fed may be more likely to issue a statement suggesting that 
further rate increases are not expected. For example, as noted in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), two larger-than-
expected rate hikes on May 17 and August 16, 1994 were accompanied by FOMC releases suggesting that further 
rate hikes were not imminent, triggering a positive market reaction.  
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𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+1                + 𝛽𝛽4𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1,  (7B) 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+1    
            + ∑𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1  + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1,   (7C) 
where FOMC Rt+1 is the CRSP value-weighted return on the FOMC announcement day, FOMC 
Surpriset+1 and FOMC Expectedt+1 are the announcement-day expected and surprise components 
of the change in target rate as defined in Appendix B, and dEt, Inflation FEt+1, Unemp FEt+1, and 
IndPro FEt+1 are as previously defined. As noted, we focus only on the relation between 
aggregate earnings and one-month-ahead FOMC announcement-day returns (and not between 
aggregate earnings and contemporaneous FOMC announcement-day returns) to ensure that the 
earnings news represented by dEt is released prior to the FOMC announcement. 
The results are reported in Table 7, Panel C. Consistent with the asymmetric results in 
Panel B (as well as the monthly results in Panel B, Table 6), the results in Panel C are also 
strongest in the negative surprise subsample. 26 In particular, while the coefficient on dEt is 
insignificant in all three specifications for the full sample (in the left panel) and the positive 
surprise subsample (in the right panel), it is negative and significant for Equation 7A and turns 
insignificant for Equations 7B and 7C when we control for policy surprises for the negative 
surprise subsample (in the middle panel). This finding suggests that when there is significant 
policy news such as in periods with negative policy surprises, the market does not fully 
anticipate the policy news in aggregate earnings prior to the FOMC announcement. 
Taken together, the FOMC announcement-day results are consistent with 1) aggregate 
earnings containing monetary policy news and 2) the negative aggregate earnings-returns 
association being driven at least in part by the market’s reaction to upcoming policy news.                                                          
26 In Table 7, Panel C, coefficients on inflation, unemployment, and industrial production forecast errors in Model 3 
are insignificant. Full results including these coefficients can be found in the Internet Appendix. 
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5.3 Additional Analysis 
5.3.1 The Effect of Policy News on Returns 
The asymmetric results above suggest that the strength of the negative aggregate 
earnings-returns association depends on the extent to which the market responds to policy news. 
To further explore this finding, we conduct rolling-regression analysis using a fixed time series 
of 12 months. Specifically, we split our sample into 18 non-overlapping windows of 12 months, 
as well as 71 overlapping windows of 12 months, with each window rolling forward three 
months. For each window, we perform three steps. First, we estimate the monthly aggregate 
earnings-returns association (i.e., β1 from Equation 4A), denoted by β1T, where T represents the 
measurement window. Second, for each window we regress Rt on Surpriset, and use the R2 from 
the regression to measure how well policy surprises explain returns for a given window. Third, 
we regress β1T on 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇2 , adjusting the standard errors for autocorrelation using the Newey-West 
correction.27  
The results for the third-step regression are reported in Table 8. Consistent with the 
results in Section 5.2.1, we find that the negative aggregate earnings-returns association is more 
pronounced in months with more policy news: the coefficient on 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇2 is -21.6 and is significant at 
the 5% level for the overlapping windows specification. For the non-overlapping windows 
specification, the coefficient is again negative at -24.9 but not significant, likely due to the low 
number of observations. These results again show that the negative aggregate earnings-returns 
association varies with the strength of the market’s reaction to policy news, and thus suggest that 
policy news is an important channel through which aggregate earnings convey discount rate 
news. 
                                                        




The Fed’s monetary policy and its potential effect on capital markets have been in the 
spotlight in the wake of the recent financial crisis. Whether fundamental accounting information 
is useful to investors and policymakers is an important question, yet little is known about what 
role aggregate earnings play in monetary policy setting and how this role affects the association 
between earnings and equity returns at the aggregate level. In this paper, we shed light on these 
questions. 
Using Federal funds futures to measure monetary policy news, we find that aggregate 
earnings are informative about both contemporaneous and one-month-ahead monthly policy 
surprises. We also find that aggregate earnings are negatively associated with both 
contemporaneous and one-month-ahead monthly returns, but that these associations are muted 
when we control for the corresponding policy surprises. This result is stronger in periods 
characterized by negative policy surprises, which tend to induce a stronger market reaction. 
Similarly, using FOMC announcement-day surprises and returns, we find a significantly negative 
association between monthly aggregate earnings news and one-month-ahead announcement-day 
returns for the negative policy surprise subsample, with this association muted after controlling 
for the one-day policy surprise. This evidence suggests that the market does not fully anticipate 
the policy news in aggregate earnings. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the 
monetary policy news channel, whereby aggregate earnings contain policy news and the market 
reacts negatively to policy surprises, which drives the negative aggregate earnings-returns 
association. 
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition 
Quarterly 
dEq  The sum of all firms’ seasonally differenced quarterly 
earnings announced in quarter q (i.e., Eq-Eq-4) scaled by 
aggregate lagged market value of equity, with earnings 
defined as earnings before extraordinary items. 
Rq  Return of the CRSP value-weighted index measured over 
the three months in quarter q.  
Targetq  The Federal funds target rate set by the FOMC as of the 
end of quarter q. 
ΔTargetq  Targetq - Targetq-1. 
Macro FRq (Macro = 
Inflation, Unemp, RGDP) 
 The difference between the median forecast made in 
quarter q for quarter q and the median forecast made in 
quarter q-1 for quarter q for inflation (GDP deflator), 
unemployment, and real GDP growth from the Philadelphia 
Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters. 
Inflationq  Average GDP deflator inflation for quarter q from the 
Philadelphia Fed’s real-time economic data set. 
Unempq  Average unemployment for quarter q from the Philadelphia 
Fed’s Real-Time Economic Database. 
RGDPq  Advance estimate of real GDP growth for quarter q from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Monthly and FOMC Announcement 
dEt  The sum of seasonally differenced earnings before 
extraordinary items announced in month t scaled by the 
sum of lagged market value of equity. 
Rt   Return of the CRSP value-weighted index in month t. 
FOMC Rt  FOMC announcement-day return of the CRSP value-
weighted index. 
Surpriset  Monthly target Federal funds rate surprise measured as 
1
𝐷𝐷
∑ 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑 −  𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1,𝐷𝐷1𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑=1 , where D is the number of days in the 
month, it,d is the actual target rate on day d in month t, and 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1,𝐷𝐷1  is the rate corresponding to the futures contract price 
for month t at the end of month t-1. 
Expectedt  Monthly expected change in the target Federal funds rate 
measured as 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1,𝐷𝐷1 −  𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1,𝐷𝐷,  which corresponds to the 
difference between the expected rate for month t as of the 
end of month t-1 and the actual target rate at the end of 
month t-1. 
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Δi  The change in the target Federal funds rate on the date of 
the FOMC announcement.  
FOMC Surpriset  The unexpected one-day change in the Federal funds rate 
on the first FOMC announcement day in month t, measured 
as 𝐷𝐷
𝐷𝐷−𝑑𝑑
(𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑0 −  𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑−10 ), where d is the current day of the 
month (i.e., the day of the FOMC announcement), D is the 
total number of days in the month, and 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑0  is the current-
month futures rate. 
FOMC Expectedt  The expected component of the one-day change in the 
Federal funds rate for the first FOMC announcement day in 
month t, measured as the difference between Δi and FOMC 
Surpriset. Represents the expected rate change as of closing 
the day prior to the announcement. 
Macro FEt (Macro = 
Inflation, Unemp, IndPro) 
 Realized first-reported monthly inflation (PPI), 
unemployment, or industrial production growth for month 
t-1 (announced in month t) less the median forecast for 
month t made in month t-1 from the MMS Survey. 
Inflationt  Realized first-reported month-over-month percentage 
growth in PPI from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for 
month t-1 released in month t. 
Unempt 
  
 First-reported unemployment percentage from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics for month t-1 released in month t. 
IndProt  First-reported monthly growth in industrial production from 




Appendix B. Measures of Monetary Policy Surprises 
 
We follow Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) in measuring monthly and 
announcement-day policy surprises. Specifically, using daily Federal funds futures 
settlement data from the CBOE, we construct measures of the surprise component and the 
expected component of a target rate change. Settlement prices for the futures contracts 
are based on the average effective federal funds rate over a given contract month. While 
many FOMC meetings are scheduled, there are also a number of unscheduled meetings 
during the sample period. Thus, a given month may contain a surprise (either through 
action or inaction on the part of the FOMC). We measure the monthly surprise (Surpriset) 
as follows:  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 =  1𝐷𝐷 ∑ 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑 −  𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1,𝐷𝐷1𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑=1 ,       (B.1) 
where the first term is the average federal funds rate in month t, D is the number of days 
in month t, it,d is the effective Federal funds rate on day d in month t, and 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1,𝐷𝐷1  is the rate 
corresponding to the contract price for month t at the end of month t-1 (i.e., day D). For 
example, a settlement price of 97.50 corresponds to an average Federal funds rate of 
2.50%. Because more than one contract is traded on any given day, the superscript 1 
refers to the one-month-ahead contract (i.e., the contract for month t). We then calculate 
the expected component (Expectedt) of a target rate change as the difference between the 
expected average rate (i.e., the rate corresponding to the contract price for month t on the 
last day of month t-1) and the actual rate at the end of month t-1, 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 =  𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1,𝐷𝐷1 −  𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1,𝐷𝐷,      (B.2) 
where 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1,𝐷𝐷 is the effective Federal funds rate on the last day of month t-1. 
As noted in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), the monthly surprise suffers from an 
aggregation effect. In particular, the surprise is dampened due to the averaging of the 
daily target. In addition, the monthly surprise may contain an anticipated component due 
to news that comes out between the end of the prior month and the FOMC action in 
month t. To address these concerns, we also construct the one-day surprise for each of the 
157 FOMC announcements in our sample period to provide a cleaner estimate of the 
news in an FOMC announcement. We follow Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), as well as 
more recent literature (e.g., Jansen and Zervou, 2015; Gorodnichenko and Weber, 2016) 
and exclude the September 17, 2001 observation from our daily returns tests. This 
observation marks the first day of trading after September 11 and hence stock market 
activity that day cannot be attributed to monetary policy news. We denote the 
announcement-day surprise for the FOMC announcement in month t as FOMC Surpriset. 
When there is more than one FOMC meeting in a month, we use the first policy surprise 
for that month. Of the 223 monthly observations in our full sample, twelve (one) months 
contain two (three) FOMC announcements; all other observations contain only one 
FOMC announcement in the month.  
Since the settlement price reflects an average rate, we scale each target rate 
change by the number of days in the month affected by the target rate change and 
measure the announcement-day surprise (FOMC Surpriset) as follows: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 =  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷−𝑑𝑑 (𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑0 −  𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑−10 ),     (B.3) 
where d is the day of the first FOMC announcement in month t, D is the number of days 
in month t, and 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑0  is the current-month futures contract rate (denoted by superscript 0) 
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on day d in month t. We follow Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and use the unscaled 
change in the futures rate when the FOMC meeting falls in the last three days of the 
month. When the meeting occurs on the first day of the month, we use 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1,𝐷𝐷0  rather than 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑−10 . The expected change in the Federal funds rate, FOMC Expectedt, is then given as 
the difference between the actual change and FOMC Surpriset, 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 =  ∆𝐼𝐼 −  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡,    (B.4) 
where ∆𝐼𝐼 is the actual rate change. Thus, FOMC Expected is the expected rate change 
implied by the closing price of the Federal fund future’s contract on the day before the 
announcement. Correctly identifying the announcement or “event” date is important in 
measuring the announcement-day policy surprise. In February 1994, the Fed began 
explicitly announcing changes in the target rate immediately after each FOMC meeting, 
and hence in the post-1994 period it is common to assign the rate change to the day of the 
FOMC meeting. Prior to 1994, the market generally became aware of a policy change the 
day following the FOMC meeting, when the change was implemented by the Trading 
Desk. Thus, in the pre-1994 period, we follow Hilton (1994), Rudebusch (1995), and 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and assign rate changes to the day following the meeting.28 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) find similar market reactions to policy changes before and 
after 1994, suggesting that the trading desk’s implementation date (the date when a policy 
change becomes news to the market) serves as a reasonable event date in the pre-1994 




                                                        
28  The pre-1994 FOMC event dates can also be found on Kenneth Kuttner’s website at 
http://econ.williams.edu/people/knk1/research. 
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Appendix C. Vector Autoregression Analysis 
 
Table C1. Aggregate Earnings Growth and Monetary Policy: Impulse Response 
Functions from Structural VAR Analysis 
 
Step    IRF  Lower   Upper      S.E. 
1 0.175 0.002 0.348 0.105 
2 0.097 -0.081 0.275 0.108 
3 0.119 -0.064 0.303 0.111 
4 -0.036 -0.184 0.112 0.090 
The table presents structural impulse response functions and 90% bootstrapped confidence 
intervals based on 1,000 replications for the five-variable VAR model (dEq, RGDPq, Inflationq, 
Unempq, and ΔTargetq) for the full quarterly sample period (1972-2007). “Step” is the number of 
quarters following the shock at time 0 for the lagged impulse that the response is related to. “IRF” 
is the response of the target Federal funds rate changes to a one-standard-deviation shock to dE. 
“Lower” and “Upper” represent the lower and upper bounds of the 90% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 1. Aggregate Earnings Growth and Monetary Policy: Impulse Response 




Figure 1 presents the impulse response of ΔTarget to a one-standard-deviation shock to dE for a 
five-variable structural VAR model (dEq, RGDPq, Unempq, Inflationq, and ΔTargetq) over the 
period 1972 to 2007. The shaded area represents 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 
1,000 replications. The quarterly sample includes all firms with a fiscal year ending in March, 
June, September, or December. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
   
Impulse: dEq Response: ΔTargetq 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Quarterly Analysis 
 
 Mean  Median 















dEq 0.009 0.113 0.241 0.127  -0.023 0.111 0.231 0.138 
∆Targetq -1.182 0.000 1.021 0.005  -0.563 0.000 0.500 0.000 
Inflation FRq -0.109 -0.029 0.127 0.004  -0.169 -0.073 0.159 -0.041 
Unemp FRq 0.108 -0.098 -0.099 -0.032  0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 
RGDP FRq -1.126 -0.039 0.157 -0.313  -0.879 -0.106 -0.017 -0.267 
This table reports mean and median statistics for quarterly aggregate earnings changes, Federal funds target rate changes, and macroeconomic 
forecast revisions. The quarterly sample includes all firms with fiscal years ending in March, June, September, or December over the period 1972 to 
2007. The sample is partitioned into periods of “Decrease” (i.e., decreasing target rate), “Increase” (i.e., increasing target rate), or “No Change” (i.e., 
when the target rate stays the same). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
dEq -7.582** -11.610** -7.698 -4.781 
 
-5.047* -11.321** -7.818 -5.315 
 
(-2.591)  (-2.403) (-1.505) (-0.862) 
 
(-1.884) (-2.526) (-1.639) (-1.052) 
dEq-1    5.057 3.449 3.411 
 
 7.799* 6.514 6.846 
 
 -1.048 -0.707 -0.66 
 































Intercept 4.435*** 4.286*** 4.008*** 4.261*** 
 
3.683*** 3.474*** 3.195*** 3.481*** 
 
(5.042) (4.811) (4.55) (4.623) 
 
(4.685)  (4.398) (4.049) (4.199) 
Macro Controls No No No Yes 
 
No No No Yes 
Observations 116 116 116 116 
 
144 144 144 144 
Adj. R2 0.047 0.048 0.085 0.092 
 
0.018 0.031 0.055 0.071 
This table reports the results of quarterly regressions of market returns on contemporaneous aggregate earnings changes for the periods 1972 to 
2000 and 1972 to 2007. The quarterly sample includes all firms with fiscal years ending in March, June, September, or December. Model 1 reports 
results of regressions of quarterly returns (Rq) on dEq, where q is the quarter of the earnings announcement. Model 2 adds controls for lagged 
earnings news (dEq-1). Model 3 adds controls for contemporaneous and lagged changes in the target rate (∆Targetq and ∆Targetq-1). Model 4 adds 
controls for macroeconomic news measured as forecast revisions in inflation, unemployment, and real GDP growth (Inflation FRq, Unemp FRq, 
and RGDP FRq). All variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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dEt -0.161 0.077 0.157 0.045  -0.140 0.086 0.162 0.067 
Surpriset -0.140 -0.021 0.013 -0.038 
 
-0.125 -0.010 0.003 -0.015 
Expectedt -0.065 0.021 0.141 0.022 
 
-0.040 0.010 0.130 0.010 
Inflation FEt -0.054 -0.028 -0.013 -0.031 
 
-0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Unemp FEt 0.011 -0.045 -0.068 -0.038 
 
0.000 0.000 -0.100 0.000 
IndPro FEt -0.120 0.026 0.015 -0.002 
 
-0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table reports descriptive statistics for monthly aggregate earnings changes, the expected and surprise 
components of monthly target rate changes, and macroeconomic forecast errors, respectively. The monthly 
sample includes all firms (without any restriction on fiscal quarter end). The monthly sample spans the 
period 1989 to 2007 and is partitioned into periods of “Decrease” (i.e., decreasing target rate), “Increase” 
(i.e., increasing target rate), or “No Change” (i.e., when the target rate stays the same). All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
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 (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
















































      Observations 223 223  223 223 
Adj. R2 0.014 0.028 
 
0.045 0.047 
This table reports results of regressions of contemporaneous (one-month-ahead) monthly policy 
surprises on aggregate earnings changes for the period 1989 to 2007 in the left (right) panel. The 
monthly sample includes all firms (without any restriction on fiscal quarter end). Model 1 is the 
baseline model regressing policy surprises on dEt and dEt-3, where t is the month of the earnings 
announcement. Model 2 includes controls for macroeconomics news, measured by forecast errors 
in inflation, unemployment, and industrial production (i.e., Inflation FEt, Unemp FEt, and IndPro 
FEt). All variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 









Full Sample Surpriset ≤ 0 Surpriset > 0 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Surpriset -9.540*** -10.009*** 3.672 
 
(-3.415) (-3.046) (0.321) 
Expectedt -1.104 -4.083 4.159 
 
(-0.419) (-1.265) (0.905) 
Intercept 0.613** 0.766* 0.040 
 
(2.136) (1.886) (0.068) 
    Observations 223 147 76 
Adj. R2 0.042 0.053 -0.016 
This table reports results of regressions of monthly returns on contemporaneous values of the 
surprise and expected components of policy news (i.e., Surpriset and Expectedt) for the period 
1989 to 2007. The monthly sample includes all firms (without any restriction on fiscal quarter 
end). Model 1 reports results for the full sample. Model 2 (3) reports results for the subsample 
with negative (positive) Federal funds target rate surprises. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Table 6. Monthly Aggregate Earnings-Returns Association 
 





Surpriset ≤ 0  Surpriset > 0 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
dEt -1.998 -1.090 -1.078 
 
-3.112* -1.451 -1.647  -0.198 -0.309 -0.183 
 
(-1.193) (-0.639) (-0.628) 
 
(-1.690) (-0.705) (-0.789)  (-0.068) (-0.102) (-0.059) 
dEt-3 3.418* 3.587** 3.643** 
 
2.673 2.359 2.438  6.968** 6.918** 6.996** 
 
(1.934) (2.079) (2.103) 
 
























(-1.206) (-0.996)  
 
(0.170) (0.245) 
Intercept 0.846*** 0.453 0.491 
 
1.377*** 0.744* 0.802*  -0.450 -0.485 -0.413 
 
(3.026) (1.533) (1.592) 
 
(4.157) (1.794) (1.808)  (-0.899) (-0.798) (-0.650) 
        
 
   Macro Controls No No Yes 
 
No No Yes  No No Yes 
Observations 223 223 223 
 
147 147 147  76 76 76 
Adj. R2 0.008 0.055 0.049 
 





Table 6 continued 
 






Surpriset ≤ 0 
 
Surpriset > 0 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
dEt -4.020** -2.652 -2.510 
 
-3.979** -2.390 -2.299 
 
-2.383 -2.847 -2.605 
 
(-2.445) (-1.568) (-1.472) 
 
(-2.130) (-1.250) (-1.190) 
 
(-0.718) (-0.801) (-0.715) 
dEt-3 6.083*** 6.046*** 5.984*** 
 
4.538** 4.420** 4.407** 
 
9.463*** 9.697*** 9.877*** 
 
(3.518) (3.583) (3.526) 
 
(2.257) (2.251) (2.228) 
 



























Intercept 0.781*** 0.376 0.412 
 
1.263*** 0.648 0.705 
 
-0.442 -0.311 -0.342 
 
(2.844) (1.287) (1.352) 
 
(3.845) (1.581) (1.622) 
 
(-0.895) (-0.528) (-0.553) 
            Macro 
Controls No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
Observations 223 223 223 
 
147 147 147 
 
76 76 76 
Adj. R2 0.045 0.092 0.083 
 
0.025 0.073 0.061 
 
0.118 0.096 0.068 
Panel A (B) reports results of regressions of contemporaneous (one-month-ahead) monthly returns on aggregate earnings changes for the period 
1989 to 2007, both for the full sample and for the positive and negative Federal funds target rate surprise subsamples. The monthly sample includes 
all firms (without any restriction on fiscal quarter end). Model 1 is the baseline model regressing returns on dEt and dEt-3, where t is the month of the 
earnings announcement. Model 2 includes the corresponding surprise and expected components of the change in target Federal funds rate (i.e., 
Surprise and Expected), and Model 3 adds controls for macroeconomic news measured by forecast errors in inflation, unemployment, and industrial 
production. All variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. FOMC Announcement-Day Analysis 
 
Panel A. Aggregate Earnings and Policy Surprises 
 
FOMC Surpriset+1 
  (1) (2) 
dEt 0.114** 0.112** 
 
(2.101) (2.070) 


















Intercept -0.033*** -0.037*** 
 
(-3.869) (-4.164) 
   Observations 157                 157 
Adj. R2 0.046 0.055 
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Table 7 continued 
 
Panel B. Market Reaction to Policy News 
 
FOMC Rt 
  Full Sample FOMC Surpriset ≤ 0 FOMC Surpriset > 0 
  (1) (2) (3)  
FOMC_Surpriset -4.982*** -4.657*** -2.889 
 
(-5.358) (-4.257) (-0.681) 
FOMC_Expectedt 0.795* -0.276 1.865** 
 
(1.766) (-0.455) (2.659) 
Intercept 0.132 0.159 0.014 
 
(1.613) (1.524) (0.054) 
    Observations 157 115 42 
Adj. R2 0.148 0.145 0.110 
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Table 7 continued 
 






FOMC Surpriset+1 ≤ 0 
 
FOMC Surpriset+1 > 0 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
dEt -0.747 -0.782 -0.876 
 
-1.392** -0.659 -0.963 
 
0.585 -1.530 -1.312 
 
(-1.313) (-1.352) (-1.505) 
 
(-2.248) (-1.047) (-1.554) 
 
(0.474) (-1.071) (-0.847) 
dEt-3 0.958 1.158** 1.213** 
 
1.363** 1.119* 1.418** 
 
0.536 1.893 1.580 
 
(1.529) (1.998) (2.099) 
 
(1.982) (1.735) (2.257) 
 



























Intercept 0.230** 0.092 0.148* 
 
0.380*** 0.138 0.243** 
 
-0.179 -0.041 0.010 
 
(2.579) (1.069) (1.667) 
 
(3.922) (1.283) (2.231) 
 
(-0.919) (-0.156) (0.034) 
            Macro Controls No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
Observations 157 157 157 
 
115 115 115 
 
42 42 42 
Adj. R2 0.003 0.159 0.177 
 
0.028 0.153 0.213 
 
-0.009 0.108 0.040 
This table reports results for the FOMC announcement-day analyses for the period 1989 to 2007. Panel A reports results of regressions of one-
month-ahead announcement-day target rate surprises on monthly aggregate earnings news. Model 2 includes controls for forecast errors in 
inflation, unemployment, and industrial production growth. Panel B reports results for regressions of announcement-day returns on 
contemporaneous values of the surprise and expected components of announcement-day policy news. Model 1 is run on the full sample, while 
Models 2 and 3 are used to examine the negative and positive Federal fund target rate surprise subsamples, respectively. Panel C reports results of 
regressions of one-month-ahead announcement-day returns on monthly aggregate earnings changes for the full sample and for the positive and 
negative target rate surprise subsamples. Model 2 includes controls for the surprise and expected components of the change in the target funds rate. 
Model 3 includes controls for macroeconomic news measured by forecast errors in inflation, unemployment, and industrial production. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Aggregate Earnings-Returns Association and Market Reaction to Policy News 
 
 
 12-month Non-overlapping Regressions  12-month Rolling Regressions 
 
β1T  β1T 
 
(1)  (2) 
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇
2 -24.887  -21.575** 
 
(-1.296)  (-2.580) 
  
  
Intercept 1.444  -0.768 
 
(0.541)  (-0.400) 
  
  
Observations 18  71 
Adj. R2 0.118  0.094 
The table reports results on the relation between the monthly aggregate earnings-returns association [i.e., β1 from 
Equation (4A)] and the extent to which monthly returns are explained by policy surprises (i.e., the R2 from Rt = α + δ 
Surpriset). The monthly sample spans the period 1989 to 2007. Column (1) reports results from “12-month non-
overlapping regressions.” Column (2) reports results from “12-month rolling regressions.” with each window 
overlapping three monthly observations. For each window, we estimate β1 from Equation (4A) and R2 from Rt = α + δ 
Surpriset. We then regress β1T on 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇2, where T represents the number of 12-month windows in each set of regressions. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are calculated using standard errors with Newey-West adjustment 
for autocorrelation and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.  
 
